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Abstract 
This study examines the presence of cognitive changes in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), a 
subtype of motor neurone disease. Past research has shown executive dysfunction in patients with 
ALS and frontotemporal dementia (FTD). A minority of ALS patients without FTD also show 
some cognitive changes, however the role of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in this patient group 
has not been investigated. OFC damage can lead to perseveration and behaviour change. The 
performance of a group of 10 patients with ALS and 10 matched controls was compared on series 
of cognitive tests known to be sensitive to OFC damage. Two tests of punishment/reward 
contingency learning were used: the Iowa Gambling Task and our own task based on a previous 
study of individuals with OFC damage, which requires quickly switching from one rule to a 
newly learnt rule. A Theory of Mind task known to be sensitive to changes in FTD, the Faux Pas 
Test was also used. Cognitive tests also included a test of written verbal fluency and a test of 
confrontation naming ability, as ALS patients have previously shown deficits on these tests. This 
study did not find any significant group differences, however several patients were outside the 
normal range of scores for control participants on the three measures sensitive to OFC 
dysfunction. These results are discussed in relation to relevant research regarding orbitofrontal 
dysfunction and methodological improvements are suggested. It is concluded that cognitive 
changes in ALS non dementia can involve orbitofrontal dysfunction and that these changes can 





Motor neurone disease 
Motor neurone disease (MND) is a degenerative and terminal condition affecting upper motor 
neurones in the brain, mainly cerebral cortex and brainstem, and lower motor neurones in the 
spinal cord (Abrahams et al., 1997; Abrahams et al., 2000; Brooks, Miller, Swash & Munsat, 
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1998; Rolls, Hornak, Wade & McGrath, 1994). MND is characterised by motor dysfunction in 
the limbs and/or bulbar areas but also in abdominal and thoracic muscles (Leigh & Ray-
Chaudhuri, 1994), consequently areas with affected motor neurons show fasciculations and 
atrophy due to a lack of voluntary movement. A quarter of cases show bulbar onset and three 
quarters show limb onset (Abrahams & Goldstein, 2002; Leigh & Ray-Chaudhuri, 1994). Onset 
of MND is more likely in mid or later life and onset is most likely between the ages of 60 and 70 
(Abrahams & Goldstein, 2002; Leigh & Ray-Chaudhuri, 1994). Death generally occurs within 
five years, although mortality can vary with ethnicity: white South Africans, Mexicans and Asian 
immigrants to the UK have been found to show a lower mortality rate than the general population 
of the UK (Abrahams & Goldstein, 2002; Leigh & Ray-Chaudhuri, 1994). Death is commonly 
from asphyxiation due to respiratory failure, therefore bulbar onset or bulbar symptoms give a 
poorer prognosis (Leigh & Ray-Chaudhuri, 1994). MND is of unclear aetiology and is diagnosed 
by excluding other possible explanations for symptoms shown in an individual that are consistent 
with MND (Abrahams et al. 2000; Brooks et al., 1998; Leigh & Ray-Chaudhuri, 1994). 
 
Prevalence, incidence and genetics factors 
MND has a sex ratio of three:two male to female ratio and is sporadic in 90 to 95 percent of cases 
with an incidence of one to two people per 100,000 and a prevalence of four to six per 100,000 
(Abrahams & Goldstein, 2002; Leigh & Ray-Chaudhuri, 1994). In five to 10 percent of cases, 
MND is hereditary and the genes responsible for these hereditary cases are dominant, the main 
genetic variant identified so far is superoxide dismutase one (SOD1) (Abrahams & Goldstein, 
2002; Brooks et al., 1998). 
 
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
Several subtypes of MND have been identified, the most common being amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis (ALS). The most recently agreed criteria for the diagnosis of ALS have been proposed 
by Brooks et al. (1998). In summary these criteria are as follows: for sporadic cases of ALS and 
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hereditary cases not linked to SOD1 there must be clinical evidence of both lower motor neurone 
(LMN) and upper motor neurone (UMN) degeneration, accompanied by evidence of 
progressively spreading symptoms (Brooks et al., 1998). Exclusion criteria include lack of 
neuroimaging evidence suggesting an alternative diagnosis, and a lack of pattern and 
electrophysiological evidence that could account for the upper and/or lower motor neurone 
symptoms (Brooks et al., 1998). For a diagnosis of ALS in hereditary cases linked to SOD1, it is 
only necessary to identify a UMN or LMN signs in one region (Brooks et al., 1998). For the 
purposes of this study the term ALS shall be used to refer to the condition affecting our 
participants and previous research where applicable as it provides a more focused definition than 
the general category of MND. 
 
Cognitive changes 
Individuals with MND and Frontotemporal Dementia (FTD) may exhibit some cognitive and 
behaviour changes, including cognitive deficits in controlling changes of attention, written verbal 
fluency, facial recognition, visual perception, abstract problem solving and reasoning (Abrahams 
et al., 2005; Barson, Kinsella, Ong, & Mathers, 2000; Strong et al., 1999). Behavioural changes 
have been observed in generating and inhibiting responses, planning, behavioural monitoring and 
awareness, though there is not a complete lack of inhibition (Barson et al., 2000; Bechara et al., 
2000). There is also some evidence of working memory deficits, particularly on novel tasks 
(Barson et al., 2000; Strong et al., 1999). Some of these cognitive changes observed have been 
associated with damage to the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (O'Doherty et al., 2001). In 25 to 50 
percent of cases of ALS there are some subtle cognitive changes, which tend to be confined to, or 
most noticeable in, areas of the executive functions (Abrahams, Goldstein & Leigh, 2005; Leigh 
& Ray-Chaudhuri, 1994; Rolls et al., 1994). Some cognitive changes may not be obvious either 
to carers or to the patients themselves, as individuals with ALS tend to have diminishing 
responsibility in planning and carrying out their own activities since the condition is 
progressively debilitating (Abrahams et al., 2005). Cognitive changes observed in cases of ALS 
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are similar to those seen in cases where ALS occurs along with FTD, this is present in 
approximately three percent of sporadic ALS cases (Abrahams & Goldstein, 2002; Abrahams et 
al., 2005; Rolls et al., 1994). It is not clear if ALS patients with cognitive changes form a separate 
subgroup, or if there is a continuum between those with ALS who show slight cognitive changes 
and those with ALS and FTD (Abrahams et al., 2005). 
 
Written Verbal Fluency Index 
One of the most consistently demonstrated cognitive changes shown in non dementia patients 
with ALS is a deficit on tests of written verbal fluency (WVF). These tests have conventionally 
been used in evaluating executive dysfunction. A series of studies have found that some 
individuals with ALS show poorer performance than control participants on WVF tests 
(Abrahams et al., 1997; Abrahams et al., 1996; Abrahams et al., 2005; Abrahams et al., 2000). 
WVF tends to be impaired early on in the progress of ALS (Abrahams et al., 2005). Tests of 
WVF involve writing a list of words beginning with a given letter of the alphabet in a specified 
period of time and with certain constraints. WVF tasks are thought to measure the speed of 
internal response generation or “thinking time” (Abrahams et al., 1997; Abrahams et al., 2000). 
Traditionally WVF tests such as the Thurston Word Fluency Test have been used, however these 
do not take account of variation in writing speed between individuals (Thurstone & Thurstone, 
1962, as cited in Abrahams et al., 2005). The effect of writing speed is of particular relevance 
when testing individuals with ALS, as the disease tends to slow down most individuals’ writing 
speed compared to their pre-morbid performance and the performance of control participants. 
More recently, WVF tasks have been adapted to calculate a Written Verbal Fluency Index 
(WVFI), which factors out the effect of writing speed and gives a pure measure of thinking time, 
allowing a more accurate comparison between individuals with ALS and control groups 
(Abrahams et al., 2000). Abrahams et al. (2005) suggest from an analysis of the cognitive basis of 
written verbal fluency that the deficit that can be observed is not caused by a phonological loop 
deficit or by a deficit in primary language function of simple word retrieval but rather that the 
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basis for the observed deficits on written verbal fluency are caused by higher level executive 
functions responsible for intrinsic response generation (Abrahams et al., 2005; Abrahams et al., 
2000; Baddeley & Logie, 1999). Furthermore, Abrahams et al. (2005) found that patients 
performed worse than controls on the WVFI, but they did not find any deterioration in the 
patients’ performance after six months. They suggest that this WVFI deficit is likely to 
deteriorate slowly in spite of its occurrence early on in the progress of ALS. 
 
Various studies have proposed anatomical correlates for this WVFI deficit (Abrahams et al., 
1997; Abrahams et al., 1996; Abrahams et al. 2000), the most frequently identified area being the 
dorso-lateral pre-frontal cortex (DLPFC). Abrahams et al. (2000) claim that the selective 
cognitive impairments revealed by the WVFI are typical of extra motor cerebral dysfunction and 
that their profile of impairment is consistent with imaging evidence suggesting that the 
difficulties experienced by some ALS patients without dementia may be due to damage of the 
DLPFC. Abrahams et al. (1997) note that positron emission tomography (PET) studies of ALS 
patients have shown reduced regional cerebral blood flow (RCBF) in the left DLPFC during 
verbal fluency tasks. Abrahams et al. (1996) found that RCBF was similar between controls and 
ALS patients who did not show a deficit on the WVFI, whereas patients who performed poorly 
on the WVFI showed diminished DLPFC activation compared to the control group and normally 
performing members of the ALS group.  
 
Summary of cognitive measures on which ALS patients have shown deficits. 
In addition to deficits of written verbal fluency, ALS patients have shown poor performance on 
many common neuropsychological tests of cognitive function and memory. Cognitive deficits 
include deficits on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Mini-Mental State Examination, Graded 
Naming Test, Object Decision, Benton Judgment of Line Orientation, Paced Auditory Serial 
Addition Test, Sentence Completion Test, Story Recall, Stroop Test, Spoken Verbal Fluency 
Test, Raven Progressive Matrices and various WAIS-R subtests including Similarities and 
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Backwards Digit Span (Abrahams et al., 2005; Moretti et al., 2002; Neary, Snowden, & Mann, 
2000). Some studies also report poor memory performance on tasks involving free recall (Neary 
et al., 2000), though findings of memory deficits are not as common as findings of cognitive 
deficits. It should be noted that these findings have not been consistently replicated in all studies 
of cognitive change in ALS and that these changes tend to occur only in a minority of 
individuals. 
 
Though several studies of ALS have shown DLPFC involvement, the role of the OFC has not 
been investigated in this group, but has been shown to be involved in MND dementia. OFC 
damage can result in overt behaviour change with apparent sparing of function on standard tests 
of executive function (Bechara et al., 2000; Stone et al., 1998). Although it may initially appear 
that executive functions are intact in these individuals, several more experimental measures have 
been developed which are particularly sensitive to dysfunction of the OFC. Punishment/reward 
contingency learning paradigms have revealed perseveration deficits possibly linked to an 
insensitivity to future consequences in individuals with damage to the OFC and ventro-medial 
pre-frontal cortex (VMPFC) (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Bechara, Tranel & 
Damasio, 2000; O'Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak & Andrews, 2001; Rolls et al., 1994). 
These tasks include the Iowa Gambling Task (IOGT) (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 2000) 
and a task which involves selecting between two visual stimuli resulting in hypothetical monetary 
gain or loss (O’Doherty et al., 2001; Rolls et al., 1994). Furthermore, individuals with selective 
damage to the OFC and individuals with FTD have been shown to be impaired on a high order 
Theory of Mind (ToM) task, the “Faux Pas Test” (Gregory et al., 2002; Stone & Baron-Cohen, 
2002; Stone, Baron-Cohen & Knight, 1998). These tasks may be of use in identifying the subtle 
cognitive changes seen in some individuals with ALS who do not also exhibit FTD. 
 
                                                      Page number       of 81 7
Graded Naming Test 
The Graded Naming Tests (GNT), a measure of confrontation naming ability, involves naming a 
series of 30 pictures which have a decreasing frequency of occurrence in the English language. 
Previous research has shown patients with ALS to be impaired on this measure compared to 
control participants in both cross sectional (Abrahams et al. 2004; Strong et al., 1999) and 
longitudinal studies (Abrahams et al., 2005).  
 
Research findings related to measures involving the OFC 
1 Iowa Gambling Task 
Bechara et al. (1994) have developed and used a task known as the IOGT which can identify 
specific deficits relating to perseveration and punishment/reward learning. This task involves 
selecting cards, one at a time from one of four decks, resulting in feedback indicating 
hypothetical monetary gain or loss. Various adaptations have been used with differing 
reinforcement schedules and patterns of responses but the general principle of the task is as 
follows: two decks will give high immediate reward but even higher delayed punishment, these 
two are the bad decks and result in overall monetary loss. The other two decks will give low 
immediate reward but also low delayed punishment leading to overall monetary gain, these are 
the good decks (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 2000). The task has been designed so that 
participants are uncertain of the results from each deck and uncertain of the outcome that they 
will receive on picking a card (Bechara et al., 1994). Before starting the task, participants are told 
that “Out of these four decks of cards, there are some that are worse than others, and to win you 
should try to stay away from bad decks. No matter how much you find yourself losing, you can 
still win the game if you avoid the worst decks.” Given this information, participants then have to 
learn which are the bad decks and try to avoid them (Bechara et al. 2002). In spite of this hint, 
Bechara et al. (1994) found that when asked, participants failed to identify accurately the 
frequency of gains or losses associated with each deck. Consequently, the IOGT is thought to test 
the ability to gauge or estimate which decks are going to be better in a way that is similar to 
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decisions regarding behaviour in social situations. Maia and McClelland (2004) have recently 
questioned this assumption, suggesting that participants have more conscious knowledge than 
previously thought, although it should be noted that Maia and McClelland’s study was only 
assessing normal individuals who showed no cognitive changes. 
 
Initially the IOGT was used with individuals who had damage to the VMPFC. These individuals 
showed insensitivity to the consequences of their actions and therefore impairments on the IOGT, 
but showed spared intellectual and problem solving abilities (Bechara et al., 1994). Their study 
actively discriminated for these individuals because they exhibited abnormal and detrimental 
decision making behaviour. They found that individuals with VMPFC damage picked 
significantly more cards from bad decks compared with control participants who picked more 
cards from good decks. Bechara et al. (1994) proposed three possible explanations for this: 
hypersensitivity to reward, insensitivity to punishment or insensitivity to future consequences 
resulting in a focus on current benefits. 
 
The basis for deficits on the IOGT observed in individuals with frontal dysfunction has been 
further explored by Bechara et al. (2000) using a similar group with VMPFC damage. Their study 
concluded that the most probable explanation for poor performance on the IOGT in this group is 
an insensitivity to future consequences. The somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994, as cited 
in Bechara et al., 2000) is thought to provide the best explanation of these findings by Bechara 
and his colleagues (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 2000), though some researchers question 
this assumption (Maia & McClelland, 2004; Maia & McClelland, 2005). Bechara et al. (1994) 
propose that individuals with VMPFC damage can identify what the consequences of an action 
may be but are then unable to act on it. They suggest that these individuals have stable 
representations of possible future consequences but these representations are not somatically 
tagged as either positive or negative outcomes (Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio, 1994, as cited in 
Bechara et al., 2000). Therefore, these individuals find it difficult to decide whether future 
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consequences should be aimed for or avoided. Bechara et al. (2000) showed that modifications to 
the IOGT which increased the punishment received in later selections for bad decks and 
decreased the reward received in later selections for good decks did not change the behaviour of 
their participants so that they were more likely to select good decks. They claim that this shows 
that such individuals are not hypersensitive to reward or insensitive to punishment, therefore 
insensitivity to future consequences or “myopia for the future,” as explained by the somatic 
marker hypothesis, has been posited as the most likely explanation (Bechara et al., 2000, p. 
2198). 
 
2 Visual Discrimination Learning Task 
Another punishment/reward contingency learning paradigm, similar to the IOGT has been used 
with individuals with damage to the OFC (O’Doherty et al., 2001; Rolls et al., 1994). This task is 
referred to as the Visual Discrimination Learning Task (VDLT). Rolls et al. (1994) tested 
individuals with damage to the OFC with a task of visual discrimination in which one image was 
linked to reward and the other a lack of reward or punishment. This task was designed to assess 
the speed of response to reversal of the learned reinforcement associations. They presented one of 
two different fractal patterns to their participants on a computer screen one at a time. Their 
participants were rewarded with a point for touching the correct pattern or for not touching the 
incorrect pattern and punished by loosing a point for touching the incorrect pattern. Feedback was 
given after each selection as to whether the selection was correct or incorrect (Rolls et al., 1994). 
Reinforcement contingencies were then swapped between the two patterns once nine out of 10 
correct responses was achieved. 
 
On switching reinforcement contingencies, Rolls et al. (1994) found that individuals with OFC 
damage showed perseveration. These individuals were shown to be aware of the rule change from 
a subsequent interview but appeared unable to disengage at the time. They noted that controls 
found it significantly easier to accommodate to reversed contingencies than individuals with 
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ventral frontal lobe damage. They suggest that this learning deficit may be related to emotional 
learning of when a behaviour should be stopped or in what context rules need to be switched 
when a behaviour becomes inappropriate. A proposed mechanism is that the OFC receives visual 
and auditory information which is then processed in the form of rapidly learning and relearning 
associations attached to these inputs in relation to punishment or reinforcement, and that these 
contingencies are remembered for use in similar future situations (Rolls et al., 1994). 
 
O’Doherty et al. (2001) employed a similar reversal learning task to investigate OFC activation in 
a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) study. This task involved selecting between 
two fractal pictures that appeared one above the other on a computer screen, resulting in either 
hypothetical financial gain or hypothetical financial loss. Both pictures could give either rewards 
or punishments but the relative magnitudes of the reward/punishment contingencies were such 
that one picture was more advantageous than the other. O’Doherty et al. (2001) claim that 
reversal of behavioural responses after a change in reward/punishment contingencies may be 
associated with a representation of these learnt contingencies in the OFC. They also suggest that 
the OFC may be involved in switching between reward/punishment contingencies, or relearning 
learning new contingencies. fMRI has shown medial and lateral OFC activation during rewarding 
and punishing selections when compared to a control condition of the same task in which neutral 
feedback was given (O’Doherty et al., 2001). Within the OFC, medial areas were active during a 
punishing response and lateral areas during a rewarding response. The magnitude of this 
activation increased with the magnitude of financial gain or loss. They propose that this 
differential activation of the OFC may also account for some of the deficits exhibited on tasks 
such as the IOGT by individuals with similar patterns of frontal lobe damage. 
 
3 Faux Pas Test 
The OFC also appears to be involved in social cognition processes. Patients with damage to the 
OFC have been shown to be impaired on the Faux Pas Test, which is a high level Theory of Mind 
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task involving judgments about social situations. This test is normally passed by children at 
between nine and 11 years old (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999; 
Gregory et al., 2002; Stone et al., 1998). A faux pas occurs when someone says something they 
should not have said but does not realise or know that they should not have said it (Gregory et al., 
2002; Stone et al., 1998). In order to understand that a faux pas has occurred, two or more 
representations of mental states need to be compared. Firstly, there needs to be an understanding 
that the individual committing the faux pas, that is the individual who said or did something 
offensive, does not realise that their actions or words are offensive. Secondly, there needs to be 
an understanding that the recipient of the faux pas would feel an unpleasant emotion as a result of 
the other’s actions (Gregory et al., 2002; Stone et al., 1998). The Faux Pas Test involves reading 
a series of short stories that are about a paragraph long, each containing a faux pas. The 
participant is read each story, also having a copy of it to follow along and refer back to in order to 
reduce demands on working memory. A set of questions are then asked to determine whether the 
participant can identify the faux pas, to determine whether the participant can empathise with the 
recipient and two control questions are asked to check that the participant has understood the 
story (Gregory et al., 2002; Stone et al., 1998; Stone & Baron-Cohen, 2002). Stone et al. (1998) 
employed a version of the Faux Pas Test with 10 stories, all of which contained a faux pas, 
however more recent studies have used a version which also included 10 control stories which 
contain a small conflict but not a faux pas (Gregory et al., 2002; Stone & Baron-Cohen, 2002).  
 
This type of task has traditionally been used with autistic individuals with Asperger's syndrome; 
these individuals show an understanding of the story, but fail to identify the faux pas (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999; Stone et al., 1998). A deficit on this type of task may have a similar 
neurological basis to that seen in those individuals with frontal damage who show an insensitivity 
to future consequences on punishment/reward contingency learning paradigms. Stone et al. 
(1998) found that individuals with bilateral lesions to the OFC performed in a similar manner to 
individuals with Asperger's syndrome on the faux pas related question and were significantly 
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impaired in their performance on this task in comparison to control participants. However, they 
performed normally on control questions, indicating that they understood the story and performed 
normally on the question regarding empathy. Stone et al. (1998) noted that an inability to answer 
the question “why shouldn’t he/she have said it or why was it awkward”, as shown by some of 
their OFC patients, indicates that recognition of a faux pas requires an understanding of the effect 
of an individual’s actions and words on others, not merely the ability to assign mental states to 
others. A proposed explanation for these findings is that those with damage to the OFC have 
difficulty linking emotional understanding with Theory of Mind inferences (Stone et al., 1998). 
This explanation supports the hypothesis that the OFC and amygdala are involved in interpreting 
the impact of other people’s actions in ToM tasks (Brothers & Ring, 1992, as cited in Stone et al., 
1998). Patients with FTD have also shown similar deficits on the Faux Pas Test (Gregory et al., 
2002; Stone et al., 1998). These researchers found that the degree of ventromedial frontal atrophy 
in participants, showed an association with performance on the Faux Pas Test; greater atrophy 
resulted in poorer performance. They suggest that this is evidence of frontal involvement in 
understanding ToM tasks, particularly involvement of the ventromedial cortex. Stone et al. 
(1998) and Gregory et al. (2002) propose that the OFC is part of a circuit of ToM and not an area 
of localisation.  
 
Aims of this study 
This study shall focus on exploring the existence of cognitive changes in ALS non dementia 
patients that have been seen to be concomitant with subtle behavioural changes such as 
impulsiveness and emotional changes. It will not discuss the area of behaviour change in ALS. 
This study seeks to investigate further the prevalence and variety of cognitive changes observed 
in patients with ALS on dementia by assessing a group of patients with ALS non dementia in 
comparison to a control group of normal individuals matched for age, years of full time education 
and estimated Full scale IQ. Assessment will involve tests of executive functioning including the 
WVFI, the IOGT, a VDLT similar to the one used by O’Doherty et al. (2001), the Faux Pas Test 
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and the Graded Naming Test. These tests were used in order to ascertain if deficits observed in 




As cognitive changes are only thought to occur in 25 to 50 percent of individuals with ALS non 
dementia, our hypotheses are that some of the individuals with ALS will show poorer 
performance on the WVFI and GNT in comparison to control participants as has been previously 
demonstrated (Abrahams et al., 2005; Abrahams et al. 2004; Strong et al., 1999). We suggest that 
some individuals with ALS will make more selections from bad decks and fewer selections from 
good decks on the IOGT and fail to respond quickly to changed contingencies in the VDLT in 
comparison to control participants. We suggest that some individuals with ALS may also perform 
worse than control participants on some of the specific faux pas questions on stories containing a 
faux pas in the Faux Pas Test, but that there will be no difference between individuals with ALS 
and control participants on the control questions, empathy question and on the questions for the 




Selection of Participants 
ALS patients 
Patients with ALS were recruited through the regional MND service at the Western General 
Hospital, Edinburgh. Inclusion criteria for ALS patients were as follows: aged between 30 and 
80, first language English (an understanding of English is necessary for some of the tests of 
cognitive function) and evidence of both lower motor neurone and upper motor neurone 
degeneration in one or more regions, in accordance with criteria in Brooks et al. (1998). Patients 
with severe disability were excluded as they would find the interview and testing period of 
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approximately two hours excessively physically taxing. Information regarding suitability was 
obtained from patients’ records held at the Western General Hospital prior to inviting patients to 
participate and ethical approval was gained from the NHS Lothian regional ethics committee. A 
total of 34 individuals with ALS were contacted and invited to participate, 20 of these responded 
and agreed to participate, two responded and declined to participate and 12 did not respond at all. 
This gives a response rate of 65%. Of the 20 who agreed to participate only 10 were able to be 
tested for the purpose of this study due to time constraints. Of the 10 who took part there were 
five male and five female participants and all were right handed. Nine of these were sporadic 
cases with no reason to suspect a familial involvement and in one case there was a family history 
of MND but no definitive familial diagnosis had been made. All patients were interviewed in 
their own home at a time of day convenient to them. 
 
Control participants 
Ten healthy control participants were also recruited: five male, five female and all right handed. 
These were chosen to be appropriately matched to the patient group for age and years of full time 
education. All control participants also had English as their first language. These participants 
were recruited from the experimenters’ friends and family. None of the control participants had 
sustained a significant head injury and none had a history of neurological disorder. Controls were 
interviewed either in their own homes or at the Psychology Department at the University of 
Edinburgh at their convenience. Financial compensation for travel expenses was offered to 
control participants. 
 
Experimental measures and procedure 
The following procedure was approved by the NHS Lothian regional ethics committee and the 
ethics committee at the Psychology Department of the University of Edinburgh. 
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Interview procedure 
All participants took part in a session of interviewing and testing which lasted approximately two 
hours. When participants were initially contacted a brief summary of the study was provided. 
Prior to beginning the period of interviewing and testing, participants were given the opportunity 
to read a more detailed information sheet outlining the aims of the study as required by ethical 
guidelines. All participants were informed that their participation was voluntary and that they had 
the right to withdraw at any time. They were also asked to sign a consent form (see appendix 1). 
Demographic information was then recorded, consisting of age, gender, handedness, years in full 
time education, occupation and questions about medical history in accordance with the exclusion 
criteria mentioned above. In addition, patients with ALS were asked about when they first 
noticed their symptoms, the region of onset e.g. limbs or bulbar, their date of diagnosis and time 
since diagnosis. During this preliminary interview with patients, the ALS functional rating scale 
was completed (Brooks et al., 1996). The remainder of the interview consisted of two parts, a 
series of cognitive tests lasting approximately one hour and 25 minutes, followed by a series of 
behavioural tests and questionnaires which formed part of a separate study and shall not be 
discussed further (see project by Alan Dunlop). The order of the cognitive tests was as follows: 
National Adult Reading Test, second edition (NART) (Nelson & Willison, 1991), WVFI 
generation conditions (Abrahams et al., 2000), IOGT (Bechara, 2002), the Faux Pas Test (Stone 
& Baron-Cohen., 2002), a computer based VDLT based on that developed by O'Doherty et al. 
(2001), WVFI control condition (Abrahams et al., 2000) ending with the Graded Naming Test 
(McKenna & Warrington, 1983). For the NART and the Faux Pas Test participants gave 
permission for their voice to be recorded to aid subsequent analysis and to speed up the interview 
process. All voice recordings used the following equipment: a Sony ECM-Z60 microphone in 
conjunction with a Griffin iMic USB Audio Interface. This was connected to an 800mhz Apple 
ibook running Mac OS X 10.4.4 operating system and Final Vinyl 1.1.2 audio recording 
software. 
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Background measure, the National Adult Reading Test 
The NART (Nelson & Willison, 1991) was administered and scored in accordance with the 
standard procedure as described in the instruction manual. This measure was recorded so that the 
patient and control groups could be matched on estimated full scale IQ. Derivation of this full 
scale IQ estimate from the NART error score is described in the approach to analysis section. The 




Written verbal fluency index 
The WVFI was administered as described in Abrahams et al. (2000 p.736). In summary, this task 
involved two generation conditions, the first was writing down as many words beginning with the 
letter "S" in five minutes as the participant could think of, the second, writing down as many four 
letter words beginning with "C" as the participant can think of in four minutes. There was a later 
control condition designed to factor out the effect of writing speed. This involved timing the 
participant as they copied out their previously generated lists. In addition to the information 
regarding the WVFI given in Abrahams et al. (2000), participants were instructed to write their 
lists of words on a pad of lined paper in a vertical column, one word on each line. In the control 
condition they were asked to copy their original list as quickly as possible on the same piece of 
paper. It was then possible to calculate a WVFI for the two generation conditions and an overall 
WVFI across both generation conditions as described in Abrahams et al. (1997 p.465) and 
Abrahams et al. (2000 p.736). Generation times and copy times are all measured in seconds.  
 
Iowa Gambling Task 
Participants were asked to play a computer game, which was a computerised version of the 
original ABCD variant Iowa Gambling Task (Version 2.0 2002). See Bechara et al. (2000 
p.2194) for details of this task. The task was presented on a PC laptop computer with a 14 inch 
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screen at a resolution of 1024x768 pixels running Windows ME operating system. Participants 
used either a Logitech Cordless Notebook Mouse or the laptops’ built in track pad device to 
select card decks. The computerised task differed from the original IOGT in that bad decks would 
give greater delayed financial punishments and good decks greater delayed financial rewards in 
comparison to immediate financial reward received (Bechara et al., 2000). (For details of the 
punishment reward schedule used, see Table 1). The computerised IOGT lasted for a duration of 
100 trials, a trial involves making one selection of a card from a deck. The instructions used for 
this task are shown below. In this task instructions were read aloud to the participants who also 
had their own a copy for reference. The configurable parameters for this computer task were set 
to the default values, apart from the inter-trial interval which was set to the recommended 500 
milliseconds, as no physiological measurements were being recorded. 
 
Iowa Gambling Task -  Instructions 
1. In front of you on the screen, there are 4 decks of cards: A, B, C, and D. 
2. When we begin the game, I want you to select one card at a time by clicking on a card from any 
deck you choose. 
3. Each time you select a card, the computer will tell you that you won some money. I don’t know 
how much money you will win. You will find out as we go along. Every time you win, the green 
bar gets bigger. 
4. Every so often, when you click on a card, the computer will tell you that you won some money as 
usual, but then it will say that you lost some money as well. I don’t know when you will lose or 
how much. You will find out as we go along. Every time you lose, the green bar gets smaller. 
5. You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to the other at any time, and as often as you 
wish. 
6. The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible and avoid losing as much money as 
possible. 
7. You won’t know when the game will end. Simply keep on playing until the computer stops. 
                                                      Page number       of 81 18
8. I am going to give you $2000 of credit, the green bar, to start the game. The red bar is a reminder 
of how much money you borrowed to play the game, and how much money you have to pay back 
before we see whether you won or lost. 
9. The only hint I can give you, and the most important thing to note is this: Out of these four decks 
of cards, there are some that are worse than others, and to win you should try to stay away from 
bad decks. No matter how much you find yourself losing, you can still win the game if you avoid 
the worst decks. 
10.  Also note that the computer does not change the order of the cards once the game begins. It does 
not make you lose at random, or make you lose money based on the last card you picked. 
11. We are not able to pay you any actual money at the end of the game, but please try to win as 
much as you can during the game, have fun! 
 
Table 1: Reinforcement schedule used in the IOGT 
Deck A Deck B Deck C Deck D Selection 
number 
Win Lose Win Lose Win Lose Win Lose 
1 100 0 100 0 50 0 50 0 
2 120 0 80 0 60 0 40 0 
3 80 150 110 0 40 50 45 0 
4 90 0 120 0 55 0 45 0 
5 110 300 90 0 55 50 55 0 
6 100 0 100 0 45 0 60 0 
7 80 200 90 0 50 50 40 0 
8 120 0 120 0 45 0 55 0 
9 110 250 110 1250 60 50 50 0 
10 90 350 80 0 40 50 60 250 
11 110 0 110 0 55 0 55 0 
12 130 350 100 0 55 25 40 0 
13 90 0 90 0 65 75 60 0 
14 100 250 130 1500 45 0 40 0 
15 120 200 120 0 70 25 45 0 
16 110 0 130 0 40 0 55 0 
17 90 350 110 0 50 25 65 0 
18 130 150 90 0 60 75 70 0 
19 120 250 100 0 70 0 50 0 
20 100 0 120 0 40 50 70 275 
21 120 250 120 1750 60 0 60 0 
22 140 300 110 0 65 25 55 0 
23 110 0 140 0 55 0 65 0 
24 110 350 130 0 80 50 80 0 
25 100 0 100 0 40 25 40 0 
26 120 200 110 0 60 50 80 0 
27 130 250 120 0 55 0 40 0 
28 110 150 120 0 65 25 65 0 
29 140 250 140 0 40 75 55 300 
30 120 0 110 0 80 50 60 0 
31 130 350 130 0 65 25 65 0 
32 120 200 140 2000 75 0 75 0 
33 140 250 120 0 55 25 60 0 
34 130 250 110 0 60 25 65 0 
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35 110 150 130 0 70 25 75 325 
36 150 0 150 0 65 0 85 0 
37 140 150 110 0 55 75 45 0 
38 120 300 150 0 75 25 55 0 
39 150 350 120 0 45 50 70 0 
40 110 0 140 0 85 75 55 0 
41 140 350 140 0 70 25 70 0 
42 130 200 150 0 80 0 80 0 
43 150 250 130 0 60 25 65 0 
44 140 250 120 0 65 25 70 0 
45 120 100 140 0 75 25 80 350 
46 160 0 160 2250 70 25 90 0 
47 150 150 120 0 60 75 50 0 
48 130 300 160 0 80 25 60 0 
49 160 350 130 0 50 50 75 0 
50 120 250 150 0 90 75 60 0 
51 150 350 150 0 75 25 75 0 
52 140 200 160 0 85 25 85 0 
53 160 250 140 0 65 25 70 0 
54 150 250 130 0 70 25 75 0 
55 130 150 150 0 80 25 85 0 
56 170 250 170 0 75 25 95 0 
57 160 150 130 0 65 75 55 0 
58 140 300 170 2500 85 25 65 375 
59 170 350 140 0 55 50 80 0 
60 130 250 160 0 90 75 65 0 
 
Table 2: Reward/punishment ratios and ranges for the VDLT,  
  reproduced from O'Doherty et al. (2001 p.96) 
 Rewarding stimulus 
Punishing 
stimulus 
Reward / punishment ratio 70:30 40:60 
Reward ranges £80–250 £30–60 
Punishment ranges    £-10 to -60      £-250 to -600 
 
Visual Discrimination Learning Task 
This task was based on that described in O'Doherty et al. (2001) and was designed using Visual 
Basic Version 6.0 for 32bit Windows development running under Microsoft Windows 98 Second 
Edition, using the basic Visual Basic toolkit for with no additional control types. In this task, 
participants received hypothetical financial gain or loss after selecting one of two easily 
distinguishable fractal patterns presented one above the other on a computer screen. (See 
appendix 2 for the stimulus fractal patterns). The computer and mouse used for this task was the 
same as the one used in the IOGT. The two fractals appeared on the computer screen one above 
the other, on a white background with the text “Choose one Picture” between them (see Figure 
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1). Before any selections were made, the computer program had designated one fractal pattern as 
the rewarding stimulus and the other as the punishing stimulus. The rewarding stimulus gave high 
rewards or low punishments in the form of hypothetical financial reward or loss, the punishing 
stimulus giving low rewards and high punishments. The possible ranges of hypothetical financial 
loss or gain for both the rewarding and punishing stimuli were the same as those used by 
O'Doherty et al. (2001 p.96) (see Table 2). The participant’s task was to determine by trial and 
error which of the fractal patterns was the punishing stimulus and which was the rewarding 
stimulus. After a participant had correctly selected the rewarding stimulus in nine out of 10 
consecutive selections the punishment/reward contingencies of the two fractal patterns were 
swapped so that the previous rewarding stimulus became the punishing stimulus and vice versa. 
This is known as “reaching criterion”. The participant’s task was to realise that this had happened 
and switch to selecting the new rewarding stimulus. Participants were not explicitly informed that 
this is what they had to do but were instead given a more general set of instructions, these 
instructions are listed below.  
 
The computer program recorded the fractal selected for each trial, and whether the selection was 
of the rewarding stimulus or the punishing stimulus. It also recorded which fractal picture was the 
initial rewarding stimulus and recorded every time criterion was reached. From the results 
recorded by the computer program, the following variables were created: total number of times 
criterion reached (max. 4), number of trials to the first time criterion reached (min. 9), number of 
errors to the first criterion, number of trials between first and second criterion (min. 9), number of 
errors between first and second criterion, number of the last error trial before the second criterion, 
number of trials after the first criterion and number of errors after the first criterion. Participants 
continued to make selections between the fractal patterns until they had performed 100 trials, or 
until they had reached criterion four times. On selecting a picture, the previous image of the two 
fractals and the text “Choose one Picture” was replaced by either a cartoon of a yellow smiley 
face in the centre of the screen above the text “Well done – you have won £xxx”, or a similar 
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cartoon of a blue sad face above the text “I’m sorry – you have lost £xxx”, where xxx is the 
hypothetical amount won or lost. Money could be won or lost when selecting either the punishing 
or rewarding stimulus. After making an initial selection the total amount won or lost was 
displayed to the right of the fractal patterns as the amount written in figures along with a stack of 
coins (see Figure 1). If the participant was winning overall, this was displayed in green and if 
loosing, in red. This feedback remained on the screen for the remainder of the game and was 
updated after each selection. After each selection, the fractals were removed and immediately 
replaced with the cartoon face and corresponding message which remained on the screen for a 
total of three seconds. After the cartoon face was removed, the screen was white apart from the 
summary of the amount won or lost on the right hand side. There was a period of one second 
between the removal of the cartoon face and the reappearance of the two fractal patterns. When 
the fractal patterns reappeared, their positions, e.g. upper fractal pattern or lower fractal pattern, 
were determined at random. The rewarding and punishing contingencies associated with each 
fractal image stayed the same until criterion was reached, irrespective of whether the fractal 
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Visual Discrimination Learning Task -  Instructions 
Participants were given the following instructions prior to starting this task, these were read aloud to 
the participants who also had their own copy for reference.  
12. In front of you on the screen, there are two pictures, one above the other. 
13. When we begin the game, I want you to select a picture by clicking on it. If this is difficult for 
you, just point to the picture and I will select it for you. 
14. Each time you select a picture, the computer will tell you that you have won some money, or that 
you have lost some money. I don’t know how much money you will win or lose. You will find 
out as we go along.  
15. The amount of money you have won or lost is displayed to the right of the pictures as a pile of 
coins and the amount written in pounds. If you are winning overall, the coins and the amount are 
in green, and if you are loosing, red. 
16. The pictures will always stay the same but sometimes they will swap positions. 
17. You will see that sometimes one picture will be better than another at winning money. It doesn't 
matter which position it is in. You are absolutely free to switch from one picture to the other at 
any time, and as often as you wish. 
18. The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible and avoid losing as much money as 
possible. 
19. We are not able to pay you any actual money at the end of the game, but please try to win as 
much as you can during the game , have fun! 
 
The Faux Pas Test 
The Faux Pas Test involved presenting a series of short stories to participants. The experimenter 
said, “I’m going to be reading you some brief stories and asking you some questions about it. 
You have a copy of the story in front of you so you can read along and go back to it.” Then the 
experimenter read aloud the stories, which the participants could follow along with their own 
typed copy. Half of these stories contained a faux pas, “faux pas stories”, and half did not, 
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“control stories”. After reading each story, participants were asked several questions to assess 
their understanding of the story. These questions were either “faux pas questions”, which 
assessed understanding of whether a faux pas had been committed, or “control questions” which 
checked whether the participant had understood and remembered the content of the story. All 
stories and questions are listed in appendix 3. The first faux pas question was “Did anyone say 
something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?”. If participants answered ‘no’ to 
this question, the two control questions were then asked. If they answered ‘yes’, five more faux 
pas questions were asked: Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?, 
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?, "Why did they say it?" or "Why do 
you think they said it?", “Did X know that Y?” and “How did X feel?”. After the faux pas 
question/questions, two control questions were asked. For control stories, participants were 
expected to answer ‘no’ to the first faux pas question. For faux pas stories participants were 
expected to answer ‘yes’ to the first faux pas question and to give appropriate answers to the rest 
of the faux pas questions. The rationale behind what each of these questions is assessing and a 
detailed description of how to score them is given in Stone and Baron-Cohen (2002). 
 
The Faux Pas Test was administered as described in Stone and Baron-Cohen (2002) with the 
following alterations: story 11, a faux pas story, was removed because it contained a reference to 
a joke about a terminal illness. It was thought that this could be upsetting for the patients in our 
study. As this faux pas question was removed, control question 20 was chosen to be removed at 
random. For the purpose of administering the Faux Pas Test, the stories were re-numbered from 
one to 18, however any reference made to specific faux pas stories in this study shall refer to the 
original story number as indicated in Stone and Baron-Cohen (2002). Additionally, US English 
spellings and vocabulary used in Stone and Baron-Cohen (2002), were changed to British 
English, e.g. changing the phrase “elementary school” for “primary school”. See appendix 3 for a 
copy of the faux pas stories used with all changes. There were no other deviations from the 
procedures set out in Stone and Baron-Cohen (2002). 
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Graded Naming test 
The Graded Naming test (McKenna & Warrington, 1983) was given to all participants. This test 
involved showing participants a booklet of 30 pictures of increasing difficulty and asking “What 
is this?”. Cues could be given in the form of pointing, perceptual reorientation and semantic 
reorientation. The Graded Naming Test was administered and scored in accordance with 
guidelines given in McKenna and Warrington (1983). 
 
Statistical design 
The analyses consisted of a comparison between patients and the control group on each separate 
variable in each of the cognitive tests, except for the IOGT. These simple comparisons consisted 
of t tests for variables which showed a normal distribution and Mann-Whitney U tests for 
variables which did not fit a normal distribution. No attempt was made to correct for the 
possibility of inflated Type One error caused by the large number of separate comparisons and 
this should be taken into consideration when looking at the results. It was felt that an overly 
conservative analysis would be detrimental, as the goal of this study was to investigate suitable 
areas of investigation and suitable directions for future research to follow. The distribution of the 
data on each variable was assessed by examining a histogram. 
 
All statistical procedures were applied to the raw score for that variable unless otherwise 
indicated. Scatter plots for variables with a non normal distribution indicated that on these 
variables the two groups were relatively homogeneous. Transformations which were applied to 
raw scores on selected variables were as follows:  
 
1 
NART error scores were used to calculate an estimated WAIS-R full scale IQ using the formula 
described in Nelson and Willison (1991 p.16). 
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2 
For the IOGT the deck selections were broken down into five blocks; 1 (deck selections 1-20), 2 
(deck selections 21-40), 3 (deck selections 41-60), 4 (deck selections 61-80) and 5 (deck 
selections 81-100). The scores for selections on decks A and B were combined to give a total 
score for selections of bad decks on each block and the scores for selections on deck C and D to 
give a total for good deck selections on each block. The analysis for the IOGT consisted of a 
2x5x2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) comparing the between subjects variable of group, 
patients versus controls, with the within subjects variables of deck, good decks or bad decks, and 
block, card selection blocks 1-5. 
 
3 
For the Faux Pas Test the number of correctly identified faux pas stories and the number of 
correctly identified control stories were transformed to represent a percentage of the total number 
of stories after taking account of stories discarded for incorrect answers to control questions.  
 
A percentile analysis was conducted for each variable on each of the experimental measures. This 
involved comparing the scores of individual patients to the scores of the control group to 
ascertain whether any patients fell below the 2.5th percentile or above the 97.5th percentile of the 
distribution of scores from the control group implying whether any individual patient’s score on 
any variable fall above or below ± 1.96 standard deviations from the mean of the control group 




Demographic information and background measures 
The patient and control groups were well matched for age, number of years in full time education 
and on an estimate of WAIS-R Full scale IQ derived from the NART. Two patients were not able 
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to complete the NART due to dysarthria. Mann-Whitney U tests and t tests found no significant 
differences between patient and control groups on any of the demographic or background 
variables (see Table 3). Background information for the patient group is also reported in Table 4, 
showing the progression and severity of ALS represented in our sample. Table 5 shows a 
summary of the occupational history of both patients and controls. 
 
Table 3: Summary of background measures for patient and control groups 
              Mean ± SD (range, min-max) along with t U and p values 





Age 62.50 ± 10.94 (31-78) 56.20 ± 10.95 -1.079 - ≥0.05 
Years in full time 
education 
12.60 ± 4.12 (7-20) 14.75 ± 4.16 (10-21) - 36.00 ≥0.05 
WAIS-R Full scale IQ 
estimate from NART 
114.17 ± 10.41 (100-128)b 107.16 ± 14.22 (87-124) - 27.50 ≥0.05 
a U statistic from Mann-Whitney U analysis. 
b n=8 for ALS patients IQ estimate. n=10 for all other entries in this table. 
 
Table 4: Additional background measures recorded for the patient group. 
 Mean ± SD (range, min-max) 
Number of patients with onset in 
a particular region 
Time since onset in (years) 5.50 ± 4.17 (2-16) - 
Time since diagnosis (months) 27.56 ± 24.55 (6-84) - 
ALS Functional Rating Scale score 29.90 ± 11.94 (14-47) - 
Region of symptom onset - 
              0 Bulbar 
              4 Lower limbs  
              2 Upper limbs  
              4 All limbs 
 
Table 5: Occupation of ALS patients and control participants. 
Participants occupational category No. of ALS patients in each category. 
No. of controls 
in each category. 
Managerial and professional 1 1 
Lower managerial and professional 2 4 
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Intermediate occupation 1 2 
Small employers 1 0 
Lower supervisory and technical 0 0 
Semi routine 2 0 
Routine 2 0 
Never worked or long term unemployed 0 3 




Written verbal fluency index 
The scores for patients and controls on all WVFI variables were comparable with the notable 
exception of one control (see Table 6). Control eight performed particularly poorly and he also 
had a low level of time spent in education, only ten years and a NART score of 87. Three t tests 
showed no significant differences between patient and control groups on the overall WVFI, or on 
either of the two sub conditions: words beginning with "S" and words beginning with "C" (see 
Table 6). Four patients did not complete the WFVI due to motor difficulties. A percentile analysis 
showed that none of the patients’ scores fell below the bottom 2.5th percentile for the distribution 
of scores for control participants on any of the WVFI variables. 
 
Table 6: Analysis of Written Verbal Fluency Index. 
              Mean ± SD (range, min-max) along with t and p values 
 ALS patients Controls t value p value 
WVFI "S" 5.55 ± 2.85 (2.68-10.33) 6.58 ± 4.57 (2.75-18.14) 0.492 ≥0.05 
WVFI "C" 12.49 ± 7.71 (4.79-26.67) 16.34 ± 9.27 (5.77-37.50) 0.852 ≥0.05 
Overall WVFI 7.53 ± 3.05 (3.54-11.74) 9.32 ± 5.82 (3.98-23.95) 0.692 ≥0.05 
ALS patients n=6  Controls n=10 
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Iowa Gambling task 
All differences between the patient and control groups for the number of selections from each 
card deck A-D were in the direction described in the experimental hypothesis, with patients 
selecting more bad decks than controls and fewer good decks than controls, except for selections 
from deck C. When decks are collapsed into two variables, good decks and bad decks, 
differences between the patient and control groups are in the expected direction for all blocks 
after block one (See Figures 6 and 7). Figures 2-5 show that patients selected more cards from 
bad decks A and B than controls for all blocks after block one and patients selected fewer cards 
from deck D than controls for all blocks after block one. However, for deck C patients picked 
more cards than controls for all blocks apart from block five (see Figures 2–5). There is no 
theoretical justification for expecting a difference in any direction for block one, as at the start of 
block one participants have no experience which could inform them of which decks are 
advantageous and which are disadvantageous.  
 
Although selections from deck C were not in the expected direction, of the good decks, controls 
favoured selections from deck D over selections from deck C (see Figures 4 and 5). Table 1 
(method section) shows the exact punishments and/or rewards received for each selection from 
each deck. Deck C can be seen to give more consistent but smaller punishments and deck D less 
consistent but slightly larger punishments. It appears that control participants preferred the 
contingency of deck D. An ANOVA was performed comparing group, patients versus controls, 
with deck, good decks or bad decks, and block, card selection blocks 1-5. This showed no main 
effects for group or block, but did show a significant effect of deck. This main effect was due to 
participants selecting more good decks than bad decks in blocks 3-5 and more bad decks than 
good decks in block one. There was no interaction of group with deck or group with block and no 
interaction between group, deck and block. A significant interaction was found between block 
and deck (see Table 7). The interaction between deck and block was due to participants selecting 
more good decks than bad decks in block one and vice versa for all subsequent decks. As no 
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group differences were significant no further post hoc tests were carried out. 
 
Card selections from deck A











































Card selections from deck B












































Figure 2              Figure 3 
 
Card selections from deck C











































Card selections from deck D












































Figure 4              Figure 5 
 
Card selections from good decks











































Card selections from bad decks












































Figure 6              Figure 7 
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A percentile analysis comparing patients’ scores to the distribution of control participants’ scores 
on all IOGT variables showed that several patients were above the 97.5th percentile on bad deck 
variables. Also, several patients fell below the 2.5th percentile for good deck variables (see Table 
8). Notably, patient 10 was outside the distribution of control participants on all variables apart 
from deck C selections. During testing this participant was the only one managed to select all the 
cards from a single deck, deck B, from which he selected the maximum of 60 cards.  
 
Table 7:  Results of an ANOVA analysis of the IOGT comparing  
               deck, good decks or bad decks, and block, card selection  
               blocks 1-5, with group, patients versus controls 
 
Significant results are highlighted in bold. 
 F P value 
Main effect of  group  (1, 18) =1.000 ≥0.05 
Main effect of  deck (1, 18) =5.798 <0.05 
Main effect of  block (4, 18) =1.000 ≥0.05 
Interaction group * deck (4, 18) =1.245 ≥0.05 
Interaction group * block (4, 18) =1.000 ≥0.05 
Interaction group * deck * block (4, 18) =1.453 ≥0.05 
Interaction block * deck (4, 18) =9.358 <0.0001 
n=10 for the patient and the control group for all variables 
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Table 8: Percentile analysis and means table for the IOGT 
              Mean ± SD (range, min-max) along with the number of patients out with the normal     
              distribution of control participants for each variable and the participant numbers of  
              these patients. 
 ALS patients Controls 
No of 
patients > ± 




Deck Aa 17.30 ± 7.26 (8-30) 11.70 ± 4.03 (6-18) 5 4, 6, 8, 9, 10 
Deck Ba 29.70 ± 12.78 (16-60) 27.80 ± 8.47 (15-40) 1 10 
Bad decksa 45.30 ± 18.64 (13-80) 39.50 ± 7.85 (25-50) 3 6, 9, 10 
Deck Cb 19.40 ± 6.77 (10-31) 13.70 ± 6.43 (5-24) 0  
Deck Db 33.60 ± 11.62 (10-49) 46.80 ± 9.20 (33-60) 3 2, 8, 10 
Good Decksb 53.00 ± 15.94 (20-76) 60.50 ± 7.85 (50-75) 3 6, 9, 10 
a These are patients at or above the 97.5th percentile who selected lots of bad decks. 
b These are patients at or below the 2.5th percentile who selected very few good decks. 
 
Visual Discrimination Learning Task 
In this task patients took longer than controls to reach the first criterion and made more errors to 
the first criterion, consequently patients had fewer trials after the first criterion. The patient group 
made a similar number of errors to controls after the first criterion in spite of having fewer trials 
in which to make these errors (see Table 9). Two t tests showed a significant difference between 
patients and controls for the number of trials between the first and second criterion and the 
number of errors between the first and second criterion. The direction of this difference was 
contrary to the direction expected in our hypotheses, with controls taking more trials than patients 
and making more errors than patients between the first and second criterion (see Table 9). Mann-
Whitney U tests and a t test showed no significant differences between the patient and control 
group for the total number of times criterion was reached, the number of trials to the first 
criterion, the number of errors to the first criterion, the number of the last error trial before the 
second criterion, the number of trials after the first criterion and the number of errors after the 
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first criterion (see Table 9). As one control and one patient did not reach criterion at all there 
were nine participants in each group for number of trials to the first time criterion reached, 
number of errors to the first criterion, number of trials after the first criterion and number of 
errors after the first criterion. As several participants did not reach criterion more than once, five 
patients were compared with six controls for number of trials between first and second criterion, 
number of errors between first and second criterion and number of the last error trial before the 
second criterion. Therefore results from these variables should be interpreted with caution.  
 
A percentile analysis comparing patients’ scores to the distribution of control participants’ scores 
on all VDLT variables showed that several patients were above the 97.5th on variables where 
some patients might be expected to have higher scores due to perseveration. One patient, number 
10, was below the 2.5th percentile for the control distribution for the number of the last error trial 
before the second criterion (see table 10). On questioning participants after the interview, none 
indicated that they had a conscious awareness that punishment/reward contingencies were 
switched between the two fractal patterns. 
 
Table 9: Summary of analysis for the Visual Discrimination Learning Task  
              Mean ± SD (range, min-max) along with t, U and p values. 
              Significant results are highlighted in bold. 
 ALS patients Controls t value U stat
a p value 
Total number of times 
criterion reacheda (max 4) 
1.90 ± 1.37 (0-4) 2.30 ± 1.49 (0-4) - 42.500 ≥0.05 
Number of trials to the 
first time criterion 
reachedb (min 9) 
35.00 ± 31.75 (10-94) 18.67 ± 9.77 (9-38) - 31.000 ≥0.05 
Number of errors to the 
first criterionb 
15.33 ± 16.18 (1-48) 4.56 ± 4.04 (0-11) - 28.500 ≥0.05 
Number of trials 
between first and 
15.80 ± 4.71 (10-23) 26.50 ± 5.75 (23-38) 3.324 - <0.01 
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second criterionc (min 9) 
Number of errors 
between first and 
second criterionc 
4.40 ± 2.41 (1-7) 11.17 ± 3.66 (7-16) 3.533 - <0.01 
Number of the last 
error trial before the 
second criterionc 
28.60 ± 15.47 (11-50) 33.50 ± 6.03 (27-42) - 11.500 ≥0.05 
Number of trials after 
the first criterionb 
56.67 ± 30.13 (6-90) 76.89 ± 13.72 (49-90) - 23.500 ≥0.05 
Number of errors after 
the first criterionb 
27.00 ± 17.10 (4-53) 34.78 ± 9.10 (19-49) 1.178 - ≥0.05 
a N=10 patients N=10 controls 
b N=9 patients N=9 controls 
c N=5 patients N=6 controls 
 
Table 10: Percentile analysis of the VDLT showing the number of patients who fell in the  
    abnormal range compared with the normal distribution for control participants. 
 
No of patients > ± 1.96 
SD from control mean. 
Patient 
numbers 
Total number of times criterion reacheda 0 - 
Number of trials to the first time criterion reacheda 3 2, 8, 10 
Number of errors to the first criteriona 4 2, 8, 9, 10 
Number of trials between first and second criteriona 0 - 
Number of errors between first and second criteriona 0 - 
Number of the last error trial before the second criteriona 1 10 
Number of trials after the first criterionb 3 2, 5c, 8 
Number of errors after the first criteriona 1 4 
a These are patients at or above the 97.5th percentile. 
b These are patients at or below the 2.5th percentile. 
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c Patient 5 had few trials after the first reversal as she was very good at the task and only took 43 
trials to reach criterion 4 times, patients 2 and 8 took the full 100 trials. This patient was out with 
the normal range because she performed exceptionally well and therefore is not considered to 
show a deficit.  
 
Faux pas test 
The distribution of scores for the patients and control groups was relatively homogeneous for all 
variables on the Faux Pas Test (see Table 11), except for question four, the number of faux pas 
stories where participants correctly identified “Why do you think X said it?”. For this variable, 
patient eight got none of these questions correct and patient 10 got only two of these questions 
correct. In response to question four, patient eight always indicated that he thought the comment 
was made intentionally, either to hurt or “to get one over” the other person in the story, or he said 
“I don’t know”. Patient 10 also gave atypical responses to question four and to other questions. 
During the Faux Pas Test, patient 10 spent a lot of time reiterating what the story said without 
actually answering the question, he often had to be prompted and asked the question again. 
During the interview it appeared that he was doing this because he was unsure of how he should 
answer the faux pas questions. These atypical responses are listed in Table 12 and the stories and 
questions for these responses are in appendix 3.  
 
In spite of the atypical answers given by patients eight and 10, comparisons between the two 
groups using either t tests or Mann-Whitney U tests showed no significant differences for all 
variables. No faux pas stories were discarded for incorrectly answered control questions, however 
some control stories were discarded due to incorrect answers to control questions. Consequently, 
the scores for the number of correctly identified control stories were analysed as a percentage of 
the total number of correctly identified stories as suggested in accordance with scoring guidelines 
in Stone and Baron-Cohen (2002). The scores for the number of correctly identified faux pas 
stories were also analysed as a percentage rather than a raw score to aid comparisons between the 
                                                      Page number       of 81 35
analysis of faux pas sorties and the analysis of control stories. A percentile analysis found that the 
same patients who gave atypical answers also fell at or below the 2.5th percentile of the 
distribution of scores for the control group for several variables (see Table 11).  
 
Table 11: Means table and percentile analysis of the Faux Pas test 
              Mean ± SD (range, min-max) along with the number of patients out with the 
              normal distribution of control participants for each variable and the participant  
  numbers of these patients. 
 ALS patients Controls 
No of patients >  




Score for faux pas related 
questions on faux pas stories 
(max 54) 
 
47.30 ± 6.58 
(38-54) 
46.10 ± 6.10 
(32-53) 0 - 
Score for control questions on 
faux pas stories (max 18) 
 
18.00 ± 0.00 
(18-18) 
18.00 ± 0.00 
(18-18) 0 - 
Score for control questions on 
control stories (max 18) 
 
17.80 ± 0.42 
(17-18) 
17.90 ± 0.32 
(17-18) 2 8, 10 
Number of correctly identified 
faux pas stories (max 9) 
 
8.50 ± 0.71 
(7-9) 
7.90 ± 1.10 
(6-9) 0 - 
% of correctly identified faux pas 
stories 
 
87.59 ± 12.19 
(70-100) 
85.37 ± 11.30 
(59-98) 0 - 
Number of correctly identified 
control stories 
 
7.40 ± 1.51 
(5-9) 
7.80 ± 1.32 
(5-9) 1 8 
Number of control stories 
discarded for incorrectly 
answered control questions 
 
0.20 ± 0.42 
(0-1) 
0.20 ± 0.42 
(0-1) 0 - 
% of correctly identified control 
stories 
 
83.75 ± 14.84 
(63-100) 
87.64 ± 14.29 
(56-100) 0 - 
Number of faux pas stories where 
they correctly identified the 
person committing the faux pas 
 
8.50 ± 0.71 
(7-9) 
7.80 ± 1.23 
(5-9) 0 - 
Number of faux pas stories where 
they correctly identified “why x 
shouldn’t have said…” 
 
8.00 ± 1.05 
(6-9) 
8.00 ± 1.05 
(6-9) 0 - 
Number of faux pas stories where 6.80 ± 3.19 7.50 ± 0.97 2 8, 10 
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Number of faux pas stories where 
they correctly answered “did x 
know that y?” 
 
7.20 ± 1.87 
(4-9) 
6.20 ± 1.87 
2-8 0 - 
Number of faux pas stories where 
they correctly answered “How did 
x feel?” 
8.30 ± 0.68 
(7-9) 
7.80 ± 1.23 
(5-9) 0 - 
 
Table 12: Atypical responses given to control questions by patient eight and patient ten. 
Story no. Question Response 
Responses from patient eighta 
2 4 Why do you think 
Sarah said it? 
“To get one over on Helen” 
4 4 Why do you think 
Lisa said it? 
“Just to irritate her friend” 
7 4 Why do you think 
Mary said it? 
“Maybe she wanted a little boy” 
12 4 Why do you think 
Joe said it? 
“He was trying to be top dog” 
13 & 14 4 Why do you think 
X said it? 
“Don’t know” 
15 4 Why do you think 
Jake said it? 
“To get one over on Christine” 
18 4 Why do you think 
Claire said it? 
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Responses from patient ten 
2 4 Why do you think 
Sarah said it? 
Thought that “Sarah spilled the coffee on the dress on 
purpose, so she could bring up the party and spoil the 
surprise for Helen. Or to cause friction.” 
2 6 How do you think 
Helen felt? 
Thought that Sarah was “only concerned about herself 
because she focused on the dress rather than the party.” 
4 4 Why do you think 
Lisa said it? 
“She was jealous of Gill and trying to be catty.” 
11 4 Why do you think 
Joe said it? 
He thought that Jo said it because he “felt jealous of 
Mike and didn't want him taking over his position in the 
school.” He thought it was deliberate. 
15 4 Why do you think 
Jake said it? 
He thought that Jake said it intentionally to put one over 
and put Christine down. 
16 4 Why do you think 
Tim said it? 
“Trying to get some attention and create a scene.” 
Assumed that Tim could see Jack was waiting to pay. 
18 4 Why do you think 
Claire said it? 
“Clare said it to cause problems.” 
a Patient eight was severally dysarthric, the responses listed above were given using a light     
  writer and therefore are relatively brief. 
 
Graded Naming Test 
Patient and control groups were compared on their Graded Naming Test scores. Comparison of 
the mean, standard deviation and range of scores on the Graded Naming Test indicated that both 
groups were relatively homogeneous. The mean score for the patient group was 24.20 with a 
standard deviation of 2.78 and scores ranging from 20–29. The mean score for the control group 
was 22.80 with a standard deviation of 4.30 and scores ranging from 13–27. A t test showed no 
significant difference between the two groups (t(18)=-0.862 p≥0.05). A percentile analysis 
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comparing the scores of patients with the distribution of scores for controls did not identify any 
patients out with the normal distribution for the controls. All participants were able to complete 
the graded naming test. 
 
Discussion 
Measures of cognitive function sensitive to changes in the orbitofrontal cortex 
1 Iowa Gambling Task 
This study did not find a significant difference between patient and control groups for any of the 
IOGT variables. However, the differences shown, though not significant are in line with our 
hypothesis. The percentile analysis identified at least three individuals with ALS who appeared to 
show cognitive difficulties including perseveration, which impaired their performance relative to 
controls. Patients six, nine and 10 were out with the normal distribution for control participants 
for selections of good decks and selections of bad decks. As cognitive changes in ALS are 
thought to be subtle and do not occur in all individuals, the IOGT may not be sensitive enough to 
detect cognitive changes in this type of small sample where only some of the patient group 
exhibit cognitive changes. The difficulties shown by patients six, nine and 10 are in line with the 
deficits found by Bechara et al. (2000).  
 
The version of the IOGT used was designed to give increasing delayed punishment, for instance 
the magnitude of punishment received from a particular deck increases as participants select more 
cards from that deck (see Table 7). Selections from decks A and B will give the same amount of 
financial punishment over 60 trials, Deck A punishes frequently in small amounts and deck B 
punishes less frequently in large amounts. Decks C and D will also give the same financial 
punishment over 60 trials, deck C punishing frequently in small amounts and deck D punishes 
infrequently in larger amounts (see Table 7). This study was concerned with whether cognitive 
changes known to be linked to the OFC were present in patients with ALS whereas Bechara et al. 
(2000) focused on trying to explain the cognitive processes responsible for the deficits shown on 
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the IOGT. The modification made to the IOGT which gave increasingly severe punishment in 
later selections was introduced by Bechara et al. (2000) in order to test whether insensitivity to 
reward or hypersensitivity to punishment were appropriate explanations. Future research with 
ALS patients could use a version of the IOGT which did not increase the severity of punishment 
with later deck selections. Figures 2-7 show that for block 5, participants changed their deck 
selections as the punishment was increased. Removing this modification would make results 
more comparable across all five blocks. Figures 2-7 also show that selections for block 1 were 
not particularly representative of overall performance. The addition of a series of practice trials to 
the IOGT could help to ensure that selections were more comparable across all five blocks. 
 
There is still some debate regarding the exact cognitive changes which cause poor performance 
on the IOGT. Bechara et al. (2000) favour the somatic marker hypothesis and Rolls (1999, as 
cited in Bechara et al., 2000) has suggested that the evaluation and somatic tagging of possible 
future outcomes may occur in the OFC. Maia and McClelland (2004) claim to show that 
participants have a more conscious knowledge of the possible future outcomes in the IOGT and 
that this conscious knowledge could be what is guiding their performance rather than 
unconscious somatic markers. This claim in itself cannot however discount the somatic marker 
explanation, as the somatic marker hypothesis does not propose that this somatic tagging of 
representations of future consequences is an exclusively unconscious process (Bechara et al., 
2005). Maia and McClelland (2005) have responded to this by indicating that their findings 
suggest that somatic markers are not necessary for success on the IOGT. It should be noted that 
Maia and McClelland (2004) assessed the performance of normal individuals who were able to 
successfully identify advantageous outcomes. Both Bechara et al., 2000 and this study have 
focused on identifying individuals who fail the IOGT and propose that this failure is due to 
orbitofrontal dysfunction. As the use of the IOGT in this study was to assess its ability to detect 
cognitive change in ALS and the recent debate regarding the validity of the somatic marker 
hypothesis regards normal participants who are able to successfully identify advantageous 
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outcomes, the finer points of this debate only have a direct bearing on future research with ALS if 
research into the cognitive processes underlying performance on the IOGT indicates that the 
IOGT can be failed without impairment of somatic tagging and therefore without orbitofrontal 
dysfunction. To date this has not been demonstrated. It will be interesting to see how the findings 
of Maia and McClelland (2004) are pursued, particularly in regards to individuals who show 
impairments on the IOGT. 
 
2 Visual Discrimination Learning Task 
For this task, a group difference was found between patients and controls for the number of errors 
between the first and second criterion and the number of trials between the first and second 
criterion. This difference was in the opposite direction to that predicted in that patients took more 
trials than controls between the first and second criterion. No other significant differences were 
found. It appears that the VDLT was not particularly suited to identifying cognitive changes in 
our patient group compared to the control group. During this study several methodological 
shortcomings of the VDLT became apparent. Throughout testing it was apparent for both patients 
and controls that most participants did not have any overt awareness of which stimulus fractal 
pattern was rewarding or punishing. Consequently participants tended to make selections at 
random. It appeared that many of the participants who reached criterion one or two times did so 
by chance, and did not realise that contingencies had been changed. The results of the IOGT 
indicate that participants could identify that selections from some decks were rewarding and 
others punishing. The results from the VDLT did not show any pattern indicating that participants 
on the whole had this kind of awareness either consciously or otherwise. There are several 
modifications to the VDLT which may make this task more sensitive. Future modifications could 
include increasing the difference between the punishment and reward ranges used so that it was 
more obvious to participants which stimulus was punishing and which rewarding. 
Punishment/reward ranges similar to those used in the IOGT could be used. During the VDLT 
some participants appeared to select a stimulus accidentally as they were unaware of when the 
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pictures would swap positions. In future the VDLT could be modified to always present the two 
fractal pictures in the same position e.g. upper fractal pattern or lower fractal pattern. 
 
For participants who did not reach criterion more than once it was thought to be better to exclude 
them from analysis for “Number of trials between first and second criterion”, “Number of errors 
between first and second criterion” and “Number of the last error trial before the second 
criterion” instead of using the number of trials or errors they made from the first criterion until 
the end of the test. This decision was made because there was no way of knowing how long these 
participants would have continued before reaching criterion. The decision to limit the VDLT to 
100 trials was made to ensure that the testing session was not to long for participants. This limit 
was chosen because it is the same as they used for the IOGT, however no account was taken of 
the more subtle differences between the punishment and reward ranges in the VDLT compared to 
the IOGT. In future pilot testing, the VDLT to determine an appropriate number of trials to allow 
the test to run for would be advisable. 
 
As with the IOGT a percentile analysis indicated that a minority of patients had cognitive 
difficulties with this task. In this sense our results are similar to previous findings, however the 
VDLT used in this study is not analogous to the one used in previous studies so no direct 
comparisons can be made. Additionally as there were missing cases and the sample size was 
reduced, these results may not be particularly representative. Future research using the VDLT 
could overcome this problem by increasing the maximum number of trials as described above. 
 
3 Faux pas test 
As the Faux Pas Test administered to our participants is not analogous to the one used in previous 
research with two questions removed and some questions reworded, our results are not directly 
comparable to those of Gregory et al. (2002) although the alterations made are unlikely to have 
changed our results. No significant differences were found between the patient and control 
                                                      Page number       of 81 42
groups for all variables of the Faux Pas Test, however our results are do not contradict the 
findings of Gregory et al. (2002). They were testing patients with FTD known to show 
behavioural changes indicating of a lack of high level ToM knowledge. We tested a sample of 
ALS patients of whom we expected only a portion to show cognitive changes and furthermore to 
show cognitive changes in a less overt manner than individuals with FTD or with ALS dementia. 
It is therefore not surprising that the Faux Past Test was not sensitive enough to detect the 
cognitive changes in ALS non dementia patients. Table 11 indicates that all patients correctly 
identified at least seven faux pas stories, however this variable is only a representation of whether 
participants correctly answered question one, ”Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have 
said, or say something awkward?”. Knowing that a faux pas has occurred requires an 
understanding that the individual who said or did something offensive does not realise that their 
actions or words are offensive (Stone et al., 1998; Gregory et al., 2002). This means that answers 
to question four, “Why do you think X said it?”, give a more accurate indication of whether the 
participant could grasp the concept of a faux pas rather than merely realising that someone said 
something inappropriate.  
 
Our results are in line with previous findings in that the atypical responses given to question four 
by patient eight and patient 10 are very similar to the responses given by patients with FTD and 
OFC damage reported in Stone and Baron-Cohen (2002) and Gregory et al. (2002). Before 
analysing the Faux Pas Test, it was decided to include the responses of patient eight and 10 (see 
Table 11) as they appeared to give atypical responses during testing, additionally patient eight 
and 10 were the only patients identified as abnormal by the percentile analysis. In the case of 
patient 10 despite perseveration shown on other tests and atypical answers to the faux pas stories 
his wife did not indicate that she had noticed any cognitive changes in him since the onset of 
MND. This indicates the subtle nature of cognitive changes shown in ALS non dementia patients. 
Consequently any future use of the Faux Pas Test with this patient group would be wise to take a 
larger sample of ALS patients and to select patients from within that sample suspected of 
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showing cognitive changes using a criteria similar this study’s percentile analysis. This 
methodology would allow the Faux Pas Test to be put to better use with ALS non dementia 
patients in future. In this study number of patients who were thought to show cognitive changes 
was too small to conduct any further meaningful analysis on this subgroup. The deficits observed 
on the Faux Pas Test are consistent with the notion that the cognitive processes responsible for 
understanding ToM are part of a circuit and are not served by a single cognitive system or single 
brain area (Gregory et al., 2002; Stone et al., 1998). This circuit is thought to involve the OFC 
and it is possible that changes in the OFC could have lead to the atypical answers given in our 
study (Gregory et al., 2002; Stone et al., 1998). The results of this study are in line with the 
explanation outlined above. 
 
Other measures of cognitive function 
Written Verbal Fluency Index and Graded Naming Test 
This study also investigated whether previously identified cognitive deficits of written verbal 
fluency and confrontation naming ability found in ALS co occur with deficits on tests sensitive to 
orbitofrontal dysfunction. Previous research with the WVFI identifying a deficit in ALS patients 
has proposed the following explanation. The WVFI task taxes executive resources such as 
employing and switching between different retrieval strategies to facilitate word generation. It is 
this ability to disengage and switch between retrieval strategies that is thought to be impaired in 
some ALS patients (Abrahams et al., 2000). Our study failed to replicate previous findings of a 
written verbal fluency deficit. In our study, six patients were compared with ten controls as motor 
difficulties prevented four patients from completing the WVFI. The sample size for this 
comparison is probably too small to detect any meaningful difference. Furthermore, patient eight 
was one of the four who could not participate in the WVFI and this participant appeared to show 
deficits on several of the other tasks. Executive processes thought to be necessary for success on 
the WVFI are not necessarily the same processes which are affected in individuals who show 
impairments on the other tasks used in this study. The fact that we did not find a deficit on the 
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WVFI or GNT suggests the possibility that deficits on tasks that tap OFC functions may be 
independent of deficits on other tasks such as the WVFI and GNT. Future research comparing 
measures of orbitofrontal dysfunction with the WVFI would benefit from a larger sample to 
ensure a meaningful comparison can be made. An inherent difficulty with any research involving 
a written assessment in ALS is that the sample tested is never going to be representative of the 
whole group. Those who can't be tested have more severe motor difficulty and tend to be in the 
later stages of ALS. 
 
General discussion 
One would not expect that all types of cognitive change will have the same incidence and, if 
cognitive changes are present in an individual, these cognitive changes may be easier to detect in 
some modalities than others. As with nearly all psychological variables, what we measure with 
our tests and assessments is not an underlying variable. The Faux Pas Test does not give a direct 
measure of an individual’s ToM knowledge and the IOGT and VDLT do not directly measure 
perseveration tendency or switching ability. Rather these tests all assess a behaviour that is 
thought to depend on these underlying variables. Consequently some types of test or assessment 
are more sensitive to detecting cognitive changes than others. For the IOGT, VDLT and the Faux 
Pas Test, it appears that cognitive changes were present in patients classified as abnormal by the 
percentile analysis, but that these changes were not present in a large enough number of patients 
to be identified as significant by the above tests. In particular, patient eight and patient 10 appear 
to show cognitive difficulties on all three of these tests.  
 
Implications 
If, after future research the incidence of orbitofrontal dysfunction in non demented individuals 
with ALS can be identified, it would be useful to alert carers and professionals to the possibility 
of cognitive difficulties or related behaviour change caused by orbitofrontal dysfunction. In 
particular, deficits on Theory of Mind tasks would be likely to have most impact. However, as 
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ALS is a progressively debilitating condition and responsibility for planning and carrying out 
daily activities tends to diminish for the patient, orbitofrontal dysfunction at the level detected in 
this study is unlikely to have a significant impact on patients themselves. It is possible that ALS 
non dementia patients who show cognitive changes such as the individuals identified by the 
percentile analysis could go on to develop concomitant FTD, however the quick progression of 
the disease and subsequent death would make this type of longitudinal comparison impractical. 
Further research would be better to focus on comparative cross sectional studies investigating the 
incidence and prevalence of cognitive changes in three groups, ALS non dementia, ALS 
dementia and FTD without ALS. As no cognitive deficits were found on the WVFI or the GNT it 
would be interesting to further investigate areas of cognitive function in which deficits in one 
area can be dissociated from deficits in another area in the group of ALS non dementia. 
 
Conclusions 
This study suggests that cognitive changes in ALS non dementia can involve orbitofrontal 
dysfunction as shown by the percentile analysis of defects on the IOGT, VDLT and Faux Pas 
Test. Of our sample of 10 ALD non dementia patients, two individuals, patient eight and patient 
10, were found to show cognitive changes indicative of orbitofrontal dysfunction on all three 
measures. As no deficits were evident on the WVFI or the GNT it is concluded that cognitive 
changes indicative of orbitofrontal dysfunction can occur without measurable cognitive changes 
affecting written verbal fluency and confrontation naming ability. This study recommends using a 
larger sample in order to allow comparisons between controls and patients thought to show 
cognitive changes rather than just comparisons between controls and the entire patient group. 
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Appendices 
Appendix one  













Information Sheet for Control Participants 
 
Study title: “Thinking and Behaviour in Motor Neurone Disease (MND)” 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please 
take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. 
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take 
time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
Whilst it is known that MND only affects the motor neurons in the majority of cases, 
recent evidence has shown that there may be some involvement of other regions of the 
brain in a few sufferers. Using a battery of psychological tests and questionnaires we 
hope to investigate whether some sufferers of MND experience changes in their thinking 
and behaviour. These results will be compared to a group of participants such as 
yourself who do not have MND.  
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Why have I been chosen? 
 
We will be seeing a total of 30 healthy control participants. We will also be seeing a total 
of 30 MND patients. 
  
Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will 
be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you 
decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not affect the 
standard of care you receive. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you decide to take part we will start by asking you several background questions. Then 
we will move on to a series of tests, similar to word games and puzzles, some of which 
will take place on a laptop computer.  
 
During the testing we may sometimes ask to audio-record your voice whilst you are 
performing some of the tasks. We ensure that there will be nothing on the tape that 
could identify you in person and that these tapes will be destroyed once the data has 
been obtained. 
 
The test battery 2 hours long, if you need a break at any time you are free to do so.  
 
What do I have to do? 
 
You will not have to take medication or undergo any invasive procedure whatsoever. 
Most tests are in the forms of interviews, questionnaires or “paper and pencil” tests.  
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What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
 
We do not anticipate any health risks from taking part in this study. If you feel distressed 
at any time during the interview it is important that you let the interviewer know straight 
away. If you feel distressed after the interview please contact Dr Sharon Abrahams 0131 
650 3339.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
There will be no direct benefit to you or your carer by taking part, and your individual 
results will not be revealed to you. However, we will make any future publications of the 
findings available to you. It is hoped that this research will improve our knowledge 
relating to MND and may influence care practices in the future. 
 
What if something goes wrong? 
 
Whilst we do not anticipate any adverse effects from taking part in this study, If you are 
harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation 
arrangements.  If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have 
grounds for a legal action but you may have to pay for it.  Regardless of this, if you wish 
to complain, or have any concerns about any aspect of the way you have been 
approached or treated during the course of this study, the normal National Health 
Service complaints mechanisms should be  available to you. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be 
kept strictly confidential. Any information about you which leaves the hospital will have 
your name and address removed so that you cannot be recognised from it. You will be 
allocated an anonymous ID code during testing which will be used in place of your name 
on any future publications. 
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What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The results of the research will be published in appropriate peer-reviewed scientific 
journals for distribution to other healthcare professionals. Talks and presentations may 
be made at MNDA meetings and conferences. In all cases, your name and personal 
details will not be identified. 
 
Who is organising the research? 
 
The study is being organized by Dr. Sharon Abrahams, from the University of Edinburgh, 
in collaboration with Ms Judith Newton and Dr Richard Davenport at the Western 
General Hospital. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
This study has been granted ethics approval by the Lothian Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Contact for Further Information 
 
If you wish to ask anything further then please contact Dr Sharon Abrahams via the 
address below or on 0131 650 3339 (s.abrahams@ed.ac.uk), or Ms Judith Newton on 
0131 537 2131 (judith.newton@luht.scot.nhs.uk) 
 
Dr Sharon Abrahams 
Department of Psychology, PPLS 
7 George Square 
Edinburgh, EH8 9JZ  
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. You will be given a copy to keep. If you 
have understood the contents of this sheet and wish to take part, please complete the 
consent sheet on the next page. If you have any questions please feel free to ask them 
now. 
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Title of Project: “Thinking and Behaviour in MND” 
 




     Please initial box 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated ............................  
(version .....) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
 I understand that my voice may be audiotaped for the purpose of the study 
 





________________________ ____________________  











1 for control;  1 for researcher 













Information Sheet for People with MND 
 
Study title: “Thinking and Behaviour in Motor Neurone Disease (MND)” 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please 
take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  Take 
time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
Whilst it is known that MND only affects the motor neurons in the majority of cases, 
recent evidence has shown that there may be some involvement of other regions of the 
brain in a few sufferers. Using a battery of psychological tests and questionnaires we 
hope to investigate whether some sufferers of MND experience changes in their thinking 
and behaviour. These results will be compared to a group of participants who do not 
have MND.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
We believe this is a suitable study for you, if you would like to take part. We will be 
seeing a total of 30 MND patients. We will also be seeing a total of 30 healthy control 
participants. 
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Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part you will 
be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you 
decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not affect the 
standard of care you receive, now or in the future. 
 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
Testing can take place at your home at a time of your convenience, or at the Department 
of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, 7 George Square if you prefer. If you decide to 
take part we will start by asking you some questions about the duration of your 
symptoms and how they are affecting you at present. Then we will move on to a series 
of tests, similar to word games and puzzles, some of which will take place on a laptop 
computer.  
 
During the testing we may sometimes ask to audio-record your voice whilst you are 
performing some of the tasks. We ensure that there will be nothing on the tape that 
could identify you in person and that these tapes will be destroyed once the data has 
been obtained. 
 
As part of the study, we would separately like to ask a carer or relative who knows you 
well some questions. We are interviewing carers to try and get as many perspectives as 
possible on changes in behaviour that may, or may not occur in people with MND. This 
will consist of them having a brief interview that will enquire about any changes that may 
have occurred since the onset of your MND, and they will also be asked to complete 
some questionnaires. This will take up to half an hour and will be carried out whilst you 
are carrying out one of the tests. Any responses given to us by your carer will remain 
confidential and we will not reveal them to you. You will also be asked to fill out a version 
of these questionnaires related to any changes you may have noticed yourself. We will 
not tell your carer how you responded to any of the questionnaires. 
 
The test battery 2 hours, but this can be split into two shorter sessions if you prefer and 
if you need to take a break at any time you are free to do so.  
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What do I have to do? 
 
You will not have to come off medication or undergo any invasive procedure 
whatsoever. Most tests are in the forms of interviews, questionnaires or puzzle-like tests. 
If you are unable to write we will assist you in filling out the questionnaires. If you are 
unable to speak we may skip certain tests that rely on spoken answers.  
 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
 
We do not anticipate any health risks from taking part in this study. Due to the 
length of the battery you may find testing to be tiring. If you think this will be the 
case we recommend splitting the testing into two shorter sessions at your 
convenience, morning or afternoon. You will not be identified in our computers or 
publications by name, but by subject number, and all information will be kept 
strictly confidential. 
 
If you feel distressed at any time during the interview it is important that you let the 
interviewer know straight away. If you feel distressed after the interview please contact 
Ms Judith Newton, MND Nurse Specialist on 0131 537 2131 or Dr Sharon Abrahams 
0131 650 3339.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
There will be no direct benefit to you or your carer by taking part, and your individual 
results will not be revealed to you. However, we will make any future publications of the 
findings available to you. It is hoped that this research will improve our knowledge 
relating to MND and may influence care practices in the future. 
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What if something goes wrong? 
 
Whilst we do not anticipate any adverse effects from taking part in this study, If you are 
harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation 
arrangements.  If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have 
grounds for a legal action but you may have to pay for it.  Regardless of this, if you wish 
to complain, or have any concerns about any aspect of the way you have been 
approached or treated during the course of this study, the normal National Health 
Service complaints mechanisms should be  available to you. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be 
kept strictly confidential. Any information about you which leaves the hospital will have 
your name and address removed so that you cannot be recognised from it. You will be 
allocated an anonymous ID code during testing which will be used in place of your name 
on any future publications. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The results of the research will be published in appropriate peer-reviewed scientific 
journals for distribution to other healthcare professionals. Talks and presentations may 
be made at MNDA meetings and conferences. In all cases, your name and personal 
details will not be identified. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
The study is being organized by Dr. Sharon Abrahams, from the University of Edinburgh, 
in collaboration with Ms Judith Newton and Dr Richard Davenport at the Western 
General Hospital. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been granted ethics approval by the Lothian Research Ethics Committee. 
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Contact for Further Information 
 
If you wish to ask anything further then please contact Dr Sharon Abrahams via the 
address below or on 0131 650 3339 (s.abrahams@ed.ac.uk), or Ms Judith Newton on 
0131 537 2131 (judith.newton@luht.scot.nhs.uk) 
 
Dr Sharon Abrahams 
Department of Psychology, PPLS 
7 George Square 
Edinburgh, EH8 9JZ  
 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. You will be given a copy to keep. If you 
have understood the contents of this sheet and wish to take part, please complete the 
consent sheet on the next page. If you have any questions please feel free to ask them 
now. 
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Title of Project: “Thinking and Behaviour in MND” 
 
Name of Researcher: Dr Sharon Abrahams 
 
     Please initial box 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated ............................  
(version .....) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 I understand that my voice may be audiotaped for the purpose of the study 
 
 I understand that sections of any of my medical notes may be looked at by responsible
 individuals from King’s College Hospital, London or from regulatory authorities where it is 
relevant to my taking part in research.  I give permission for these individuals to have access 
to my records. 
 
 I agree to take part in the above study.    
 
 
________________________ ____________________  
Name of Patient Signature  Date  
 
 
_________________________ ____________________  




Researcher Signature   Date 
 
 
 1 for patient;  1 for researcher;  1 to be kept with hospital notes 
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Appendix two   








                                                      Page number       of 81 63
Appendix three 
Faux pas stories used for the Faux Pas Test with all changes, along with faux pas questions and 
control questions for each story. 
 
V. Stone  FP test   
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
1. Vicky was at a party at her friend Oliver’s house. She was talking to Oliver when another 
woman came up to them. She was one of Oliver’s neighbors. The woman said, "Hello," then 
turned to Vicky and said, " I don't think we've met. I’m Maria, what's your name?" "I’m Vicky." 
"Would anyone like something to drink?" Oliver asked.   
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?    
           If no skip to control questions. 
Incorrect: Yes  score  points   Correct: No  score  points 
 
score 2 points if they get it correct that no one said anything they shouldn't have said, 0 if they 
say someone said something they shouldn't have said 
 
If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think he/she said it? 
 
Did Oliver know that Vicky and Maria did not know each other? 
 




Control questions: In the story, where was Vicky?    point 
 
Did Vicky and Maria know each other?     point 
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V. Stone  FP test  a faux pas  point for each question answered correctly. 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
2. Helen's husband was throwing a surprise party for her birthday. He invited Sarah, a friend of 
Helen's, and said, "Don't tell anyone, especially Helen." The day before the party, Helen was over 
at Sarah's and Sarah spilled some coffee on a new dress that was hanging over her chair. "Oh!" 
said Sarah, "I was going to wear this to your party!" "What party?" said Helen. "Come on," said 
Sarah, "Let's go see if we can get the stain out." 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 




If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't Sarah have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think Sarah said it? 
 
Did Sarah remember that the party was a surprise party? 
 
How do you think Helen felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, who was the surprise party for? 
 
What got spilled on the dress? 
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V. Stone  FP test 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
3. Jim was shopping for a shirt to match his suit. The salesman showed him several shirts. Jim 
looked at them and finally found one that was the right colour. But when he went to the dressing 
room and tried it on, it didn't fit. "I'm afraid it's too small," he said to the salesman. "Not to 
worry," the salesman said. "We'll get some in next week in a larger size." "Great. I'll just come 
back then," Jim said. 
 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 




If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think he/she said it? 
 
When he tried on the shirt, did Jim know they didn’t have it in his size? 
 
How do you think Jim felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, what was Jim shopping for?     point 
 
Why was he going to come back next week?       point 
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V. Stone  FP test  a faux pas  point for each question answered correctly. 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
4. Jill had just moved into a new flat. Jill went shopping and bought some new curtains for her 
bedroom. When she had just finished decorating the flat, her best friend, Lisa, came over. Jill 
gave her a tour of the flat and asked, "How do you like my bedroom?" "Those curtains are 
horrible," Lisa said. "I hope you're going to get some new ones!" 
 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 




If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't Lisa have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think Lisa said it? 
 
Did Lisa know who had bought the curtains? 
 
How do you think Jill felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, what had Jill just bought? 
 
How long had Jill lived in this flat? 
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V. Stone  FP test 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
5. Bob went to the barber for a haircut. "How would you like it cut?" the barber asked. "I'd like 
the same style as I have now, only take about an inch off," Bob replied. The barber cut it a little 
uneven in the front, so he had to cut it shorter to even it out. "I'm afraid it's a bit shorter than you 
asked for," said the barber. "Oh well," Bob said, "it'll grow out." 
 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 




If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think he/she said it? 
 
While he was getting the haircut, did Bob know the barber was cutting it too short? 
 
How do you think Bob felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, how did Bob want his hair cut?    point 
 
How did the barber cut his hair?        point 
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V. Stone  FP test 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
6. John stopped off at the petrol station on the way home to fill up his car. He gave the cashier his 
credit card. The cashier ran it through the machine at the counter. "I'm sorry," she said, "the 
machine won't accept your card." "Hmmm, that's funny," John said. "Well, I'll just pay in cash." 
He gave her twenty pounds and said, "I filled up the tank with unleaded." 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 




If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think he/she said it? 
 
When he handed his card to the cashier, did John know the machine wouldn’t take his card? 
 
How do you think John felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, what did John stop off to buy?     point 
 
Why did he pay in cash?          point 
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V. Stone  FP test  a faux pas  point for each question answered correctly. 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
7. Sally is a three-year-old girl with a round face and short blonde hair. She was at her Aunt 
Carol's house. The doorbell rang and her Aunt Carol answered it. It was Mary, a neighbour. "Hi," 
Aunt Carol said, "Nice of you to stop by." Mary said, "Hello," then looked at Sally and said, "Oh, 




Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 
Correct: Yes  Incorrect: No 
 
 
If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't Mary have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think Mary said it? 
 
Did Mary know that Sally was a girl? 
 
How do you think Sally felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, where was Sally?    point 
 
Who came to visit?        point 
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V. Stone  FP test 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
8. Joan took her dog, Zack, out to the park. She threw a stick for him to chase. When they had 
been there a while, Pam, a neighbour of hers, passed by. They chatted for a few minutes. Then 
Pam asked, "Are you heading home? Would you like to walk together?" "Sure," Joan said. She 
called Zack, but he was busy chasing pigeons and didn't come. "It looks like he's not ready to 
go," she said. "I think we'll stay." "OK," Pam said. "I'll see you later." 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 




If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think he/she said it? 
 
When she invited her, did Pam know that Joan wouldn’t be able to walk home with her? 
 
How do you think Pam felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, where had Joan taken Zack?    point 
 
Why didn’t she walk with her friend Pam?       point 
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V. Stone  FP test 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
9. Joanne had had a major role in last year's school play and she really wanted the lead role this 
year. She took acting classes, and in the spring, she auditioned for the play. The day the decisions 
were posted, she went before class to check the list of who had made the play. She hadn't made 
the lead and had instead been cast in a minor role. She ran into her boyfriend in the hall and told 
him what had happened. "I'm sorry,” he said. "You must be disappointed." "Yes," Joanne 
answered, "I have to decide whether to take this role." 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 
Incorrect: Yes  score  points   Correct: No  score  points 
 
If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think he/she said it? 
 
When he first ran into her in the hall, did Joanne’s boyfriend know that she hadn’t gotten the 
role? 
 
How do you think Joanne felt? 
 
Control question: In the story, what role did Joanne get? 
 
What kind of role had she had the previous year?    point 
 
What did her boyfriend say?       point 
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V. Stone  FP test 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
10. Joe was at the library. He found the book he wanted about hiking in the Grand Canyon and 
went up to the front counter to check it out. When he looked in his wallet, he discovered he had 
left his library card at home. "I'm sorry," he said to the woman behind the counter. "I seem to 
have left my library card at home." "That's OK," she answered. "Tell me your name, and if we 
have you in the computer, you can check out the book just by showing me your driver’s license." 
 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 
Incorrect: Yes  score  points   Correct: No  score  points 
 
 
If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think he/she said it? 
 
When Joe went into the library, did he realize he didn’t have his library card? 
 
How do you think Joe felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, what book did Joe get at the library?    point 
 
Was he going to be able to check it out?        point 
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V. Stone  FP test  a faux pas  point for each question answered correctly. 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
12. Mike, a nine-year-old boy, just started at a new school. He was in one of the cubicles in the 
toilets at school. Joe and Peter, two other boys, came in and were standing at the sinks talking. 
Joe said, "You know that new guy in the class? His name's Mike. Doesn't he look weird? And 
he's so short!" Mike came out of the cubicle and Joe and Peter saw him. Peter said, "Oh hi, Mike! 




Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 
Correct: Yes  Incorrect: No 
 
 
If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't Joe have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think Joe said it? 
 
When Joe was talking to Peter, did he know that Mike was in one of the cubicles? 
 
How do you think Mike felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, where was Mike while Joe and Peter were talking? 
 
What did Joe say about Mike? 
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V. Stone  FP test  a faux pas  point for each question answered correctly. 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
13. Kim's cousin, Scott, was coming to visit and Kim made an apple pie especially for him. After 
dinner, she said, "I made a pie just for you. It's in the kitchen." "Mmmm," replied Scott, "It smells 




Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 
Correct: Yes  Incorrect: No 
 
 
If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't Scott have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think Scott said it? 
 
When he smelled the pie, did Scott know it was an apple pie? 
 
How do you think Kim felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, what kind of pie did Kim make? 
 
How did Kim and Scott know each other? 
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V. Stone  FP test  a faux pas  point for each question answered correctly. 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
14. Jeanette bought her friend, Anne, a crystal bowl for a wedding gift. Anne had a big wedding 
and there were a lot of presents to keep track of. About a year later, Jeanette was over one night 
at Anne's for dinner. Jeanette dropped a wine bottle by accident on the crystal bowl and the bowl 
shattered. "I'm really sorry. I've broken the bowl," said Jeanette. "Don't worry," said Anne. "I 
never liked it anyway. Someone gave it to me for my wedding." 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 
Correct: Yes  Incorrect: No 
 
 
If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't Anne have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think Anne said it? 
 
Did Anne remember that Jeannette had given her the bowl? 
 
How do you think Jeanette felt? 
 
Control question: In the story, what did Jeanette give Anne for her wedding? 
 
How did the bowl get broken? 
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V. Stone  FP test  a faux pas  point for each question answered correctly. 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
15. At Fernhaven Primary School, there was a story competition. Everyone was invited to enter. 
Several of the primary 6 children did so. Christine, in primary 6, loved the story she had entered 
in the competition. A few days later, the results of the competition were announced: Christine’s 
story had not won anything and a classmate, Jake, had won first prize. The following day, 
Christine was sitting on a bench with Jake. They were looking at his first prize trophy. Jake said, 
"It was so easy to win that contest. All of the other stories in the competition were terrible." 
"Where are you going to put your trophy?" asked Christine. 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 
Correct: Yes  Incorrect: No 
 
 
If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't Jake have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think Jake said it? 
 
Did Jake know that Christine had entered a story in the contest? 
 
How do you think Christine felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, who won the contest? 
 
Did Christine’s story win anything? 
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V. Stone  FP test  a faux pas  point for each question answered correctly. 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
16. Tim was in a restaurant. He spilled some coffee on the floor by accident. "I'll get you another 
cup of coffee," said the waiter. The waiter was gone for a while. Jack was another customer in the 
restaurant, standing by the cashier waiting to pay. Tim went up to Jack and said, "I spilled coffee 
over by my table. Can you mop it up?" 
 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 




If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't Tim have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think Tim said it? 
 
Did Tim know that Jack was another customer? 
 
How do you think Jack felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, why was Jack standing by the cashier? 
 
What did Tim spill? 
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V. Stone  FP test 
S.Baron-Cohen 
 
17. Eleanor was waiting at the bus stop. The bus was late and she had been standing there a long 
time. She was 65 and it made her tired to stand for so long. When the bus finally came, it was 
crowded and there were no seats left. She saw a neighbour, Paul, standing in the aisle of the bus. 
"Hello, Eleanor," he said. "Were you waiting there long?" "About 20 minutes," she replied. A 
young man who was sitting down got up. "would you like my seat?" 
 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 
Incorrect: Yes  score  points   Correct: No  score  points 
 
 
If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think he/she said it? 
 
When Eleanor got on the bus, did Paul know how long she had been waiting? 
 
How do you think Eleanor felt? 
 
 
Control question:  
In the story, why was Eleanor waiting at the bus stop for 20 minutes?    point 
 
Were there any seats available on the bus when she got on?     point 
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18. Roger had just started work at a new office. One day, in the coffee room, he was talking to a 
new friend, Andrew. "What does your wife do?" Andrew asked. "She's a lawyer," answered 
Roger. A few minutes later, Claire came into the coffee room looking irritated. "I just had the 
worst phone call," she told them. "Lawyers are all so arrogant and greedy. I can't stand them." 
"Do you want to come look over these reports?" Andrew asked Claire. "Not now," she replied, "I 
need my coffee." 
 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 




If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't Claire have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think Claire said it? 
 
Did Claire know that Roger’s wife was a lawyer? 
 
How do you think Roger felt? 
 
Control question: In the story, what does Roger's wife do for a living?  
 
Where were Roger and Andrew talking?       
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19. Richard bought a new car, a red Peugeot. A few weeks after he bought it, he backed it into his 
neighbour Ted's car, an old beat-up Volvo. His new car wasn’t damaged at all and he didn’t do 
much damage to Ted’s car either -- just a scratch in the paint above the wheel. Still, he went up 
and knocked on the door. When Ted answered, Richard said, "I'm really sorry. I've just put a 
small scratch on your car.” Ted looked at it and said, "Don't worry. It was only an accident." 
 
 
Did anyone say something they shouldn’t have said or something awkward?  
            If no skip to control questions. 




If yes, ask: 
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 
 
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 
 
Why do you think he/she said it? 
 
Did Richard know what his neighbour Ted’s reaction would be? 
 
How do you think Ted felt? 
 
 
Control question: In the story, what did Richard do to Ted’s car?     point 
 
How did Ted react?           point 
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Abbreviations used in this study 
 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis    ALS 
dorso-lateral pre-frontal cortex    DLPFC 
Frontotemporal Dementia    FTD 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging  fMRI 
Graded Naming Tests     GNT 
Intelligence Quotient     IQ 
Iowa Gambling Task     IOGT 
lower motor neurone     LMN 
Motor neurone disease     MND 
National Adult Reading Test, second edition  NART 
orbitofrontal cortex     OFC 
positron emission tomography    PET 
regional cerebral blood flow    RCBF 
superoxide dismutase one    SOD1 
Theory of Mind     ToM 
upper motor neurone     UMN 
ventro-medial pre-frontal cortex   VMPFC 
Visual discrimination Learning Task   VDLT 
written verbal fluency     WVF 
Written Verbal Fluency Index    WVFI 
